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Campbell v. Louisiana: Rethinking Access and Remedy for
Claims of Discrimination in Jury Selection
The United States Supreme Court has attempted to force state
courts to follow the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution since its ratification on July 9, 1868.1 Time and again,
the Court has demonstrated the importance of eliminating racial
discrimination within the court system for the purpose of fulfilling
these mandates.2 The Court has shown a heightened sensitivity
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person ... the equal protection of the laws."); see also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 554-55 (1979) (discussing the primary purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Court's efforts to enforce those purposes); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940)
(reversing the defendant's conviction because of the exclusion of African-Americans from
the grand jury and finding the jury commissioners' lack of intent to discriminate
irrelevant); Brief on the Merits for Petitioner at 29, Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419
(1998) (No. 96-1584) ("More than twenty times in the last century, the United States
Supreme Court has sent a message to state court systems: The Fourteenth Amendment
requires that states use racially neutral methods of selecting grand jurors.").
Congress also has passed legislation for the purpose of enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment. See 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1994) ("No citizen possessing all other qualifications
which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit
juror in any court of the United States, or of any State on account of race [or] color .... );
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287
(1950) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 243 and holding that it provides rights not only for the
excluded juror, but also for the accused, who has a right to have his charges heard before a
jury free from racial discrimination).
2. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (allowing third-party standing for a
white litigant asserting the rights of an excluded African-American petit juror); see also
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (extending Powers to civil
cases); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (noting that Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880), "laid the foundation for the Court's unceasing efforts to eradicate
racial discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire from which individual
jurors are drawn"); Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 554-55 (stating that the Equal Protection Clause
was designed to eradicate racial discrimination); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942)
(stating that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees jury selection free from racial
discrimination); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1880) (stating that a defendant has a
constitutional right to be indicted by a jury free from racial discrimination); Strauder, 100
U.S. at 308-09 (stating that the Equal Protection Clause forbids exclusion from jury service
based on race); Catherine Beckley, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Challenging the Use of the
Peremptory Challenge, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263, 266-69 (1988) (detailing the Court's use of
the Fourteenth Amendment to combat racial discrimination in jury selection). But see
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 632 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("As much as we would like to
eliminate completely from the courtroom the specter of racial discrimination, the
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toward such racial discrimination when evidenced during the
selection of jurors. Within this context, the Court has been willing to
bend procedural rules to ensure that it can hear claims regarding this
type of discrimination.4 The latest example of the Court's bending of
the rules occurred in Campbell v. Louisiana,5 in which the Court
addressed a claim of discrimination brought by a white defendant
Constitution does not sweep that broadly.").
3. See, e.g., Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628 ("[T]he injury caused by the discrimination is
made more severe because the government permits it to occur within the courthouse
itself."); Powers, 499 U.S. at 402 ("[O]ur Court confirmed the validity of the.., broader
constitutional imperative of race neutrality in jury selection."); Batson, 476 U.S. at 87-88
("Discrimination within the judicial system is most pernicious because it is 'a stimulant to
that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to [African-American citizens] that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.:" (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at
308)); Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 342 (1983) ("It is well settled, of course, that
purposeful discrimination against [African-Americans] or women in the selection of
federal grand jury foremen is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.");
Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 555-56 ("Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is
especially pernicious in the administration of justice."); Louisiana v. United States, 380
U.S. 145, 155-56 (1965) (affirming a broad decree by a federal district court in Louisiana
ordering that reports be made to it every month by the State of Louisiana regarding the
registration of voters in each of Louisiana's twenty-one parishes in order to "eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination [in jury selection] in the
future"); Smith, 311 U.S. at 130 ("For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from
jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws
enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government."); Audrey M. Fried, Comment, Fulfilling the Promise of
Batson: Protecting Jurors from the Use of Race-Based Peremptory Challenges by Defense
Counsel, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1314-19 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court's
emphasis on combating discrimination within jury selection). See generally Barbara D.
Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?,
92 COLUM. L. REv. 725 (1992) (discussing the Supreme Court's agenda of ending race
discrimination injury selection).
The Court's sympathetic treatment of claims of racial discrimination in jury selection
is illustrated by the traditional remedy for this grievance: automatic reversal of the
defendant's conviction or an order that the indictment be quashed. See Mitchell, 443 U.S.
at 556 (explaining that automatic reversal applies regardless of whether the defendant was
prejudiced by the discrimination because of the harm to the court system). For further
explanation of the automatic reversal rule, see infra notes 251-56 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55-56 (1992) (holding that the State
has third-party standing to challenge on equal protection grounds a white defendant's use
of peremptory strikes against African-Americans); Powers, 499 U.S. at 415 (extending
third-party standing principles to allow defendants to assert the rights of excluded jurors).
In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979), the Court declined to extend the rationale of
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which limited federal habeas corpus relief to the
context of claims of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury. See id. at 559-65. In
granting federal habeas corpus relief, the Court in Mitchell rejected Justice Powell's
observation that "a strong case may be made that claims of grand jury discrimination are
not cognizable on federal habeas corpus after Stone v. Powell." Id. at 559 (quoting
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,508 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
5. 118 S. Ct. 1419 (1998).
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regarding the exclusion of African-Americans from his grand jury.6
In Campbell, the Court held that a white criminal defendant has
third-party standing to raise equal protection and due process
objections to discrimination against potential African-American
jurors in the selection of his grand jury.7
This Note discusses the facts of Campbell, its history in the lower
courts, and the Supreme Court's resolution of the issues presented.8
The Note then reviews four important areas of background law which
the case implicates: standing,9 third-party standing, 0  racial
discrimination within the court system," and the automatic reversal
rule in the context of racially discriminatory jury selection."2 Next,
the Note discusses Campbell's impact on the third-party standing
doctrine 13 and the motivations behind the Court's extension of third-
party standing principles. 4 It then examines the Campbell Court's
failure to apply the traditional automatic reversal remedy. 5 Finally,
the Note discusses the potential effects of the Court's holding.'6
In 1994, Terry Campbell, a thirty-one-year-old white male, 7 was
convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole by a district court in Evangeline
Parish, Louisiana." Before his trial began, however, Campbell
moved to quash his grand jury indictment, alleging that the grand
jury had been selected in an unconstitutional manner.19 At the
hearing on this motion, Campbell introduced evidence establishing
the percentages of African-American residents in Evangeline Parish
6. See id at 1421.
7. See id. at 1422-26.
8. See infra notes 17-67 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 75-115 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 129-84 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 185-245 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 249-71 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 272-82 and accompanying text.
17. See Respondent's Brief at 3, Campbell (No. 96-1584).
18. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1421. The defendant and his wife, Susan Campbell,
had been separated before the murder. See State v. Campbell, 673 So. 2d 1061, 1063-64
(La. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1419 (1998). On January 11, 1992, after James Sharp
dropped Mrs. Campbell off at her house, the defendant shot Mr. Sharp through the
window of Mr. Sharp's van. See id Mr. Sharp tried to drive away from the scene, but he
wrecked his vehicle in a neighbor's yard, where he died. See id. at 1064. Campbell was
subsequently arrested and charged with second-degree murder. See id
19. See Brief on the Merits for Petitioner at 7, Campbell (No. 96-1584).
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during the prior sixteen and one-half years." Campbell showed that
although African-Americans constituted more than twenty percent of
registered voters in the parish,2' no African-American had served as a
grand jury foreperson in that parish between January 1976 and
August 1993. The State failed to present any evidence to rebut the
inference of discrimination.' The trial court, however, held that
Campbell did not have standing to raise race-based constitutional
challenges because he was white, and thus it denied the motion to
quash the grand jury indictment.24
Campbell appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, which
held that the trial court erred in ruling that Campbell had no standing
to raise race-based constitutional claims because he was white.2 The
appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for an
evidentiary hearing on whether Campbell's grand jury foreperson
was selected in a racially discriminatory fashion.26 The Supreme
Court of Louisiana, however, reversed the decision of the court of
appeal and held that a white defendant had no standing to raise race-
based constitutional claims.2 7 Because of a split among courts on the
issue of whether a white defendant has standing to raise equal
protection and due process objections regarding discrimination
against African-Americans in jury selection," the U.S. Supreme
20. See id. at 18 (summarizing Campbell's evidence).
21. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Campbell (No. 96-1584), available in 1998 WL
27944, at *23 (Jan. 20, 1998). The State stipulated to this evidence. See id.
22. See id.; Brief on the Merits for Petitioner at 19, Campbell (No. 96-1584).
23. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Campbell (No. 96-1584), available in 1998 WL
27944, at *14-*15 (Jan. 20, 1998). The State explained its failure to rebut the evidence of
discrimination by pointing to the failure of the trial court to rule formally that Campbell's
evidence established a prima facie case of discrimination. See Respondent's Brief at 4-5,
Campbell (No. 96-1584).
24. See Brief on the Merits for Petitioner at 7-8, Campbell (No. 96-1584).
25. See State v. Campbell, 651 So. 2d 412,413-14 (La. Ct. App.), rev'd, 661 So. 2d 1321
(La. 1995), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1419 (1998).
26. See id.
27. See State v. Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321, 1324 (La. 1995), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1419
(1998).
28. Several courts have granted third-party standing in such an instance. See United
States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1142 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that a challenge on due process
grounds need not be brought by a member of the excluded group); United States v. Sneed,
729 F.2d 1333, 1334 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that the fact that the defendant is not a
member of the underrepresented group does not deprive him of standing to bring a claim
of denial of equal protection when that group is excluded from serving as grand jury
forepersons); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 581 n.3 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating that the
fact that the defendants were not members of the underrepresented classes did not bar
standing to bring their claims); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 567 n.2 (1st Cir.
1970) (stating that a challenge on equal protection grounds to a jury selection system need
not be brought by a member of the allegedly excluded group), overruled on other grounds
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Court granted certiorari.2 9
Campbell argued before the Supreme Court that discrimination
in the selection of the jury foreperson violated his equal protection
and due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Campbell framed the issue facing the Court as one
involving discrimination in selecting only the grand jury foreperson.
31
After granting certiorari, however, the Court modified the issue to
encompass discrimination in the selection of grand jurors generally
because of the manner in which grand jury forepersons are selected
in Louisiana.32 In Louisiana, the judge selects the foreperson from
the grand jury venire before the remaining members of the grand jury
by Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc); State v. Parro, 385 A.2d 1258,
1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (stating that a defendant has standing to raise equal
protection claims of discrimination within jury selection regardless of whether he is a
member of the excluded group); Aldrich v. Texas, 928 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (same).
Other courts, however, have denied standing. See Haley v. Armontrout, 924 F.2d 735,
739 (8th Cir. 1991) (allowing standing for Sixth Amendment claims but denying it for
equal protection claims when the defendant is not a member of the excluded class);
United States v. Cronn, 717 F.2d 164, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the defendant
must be a member of the excluded group to raise an equal protection claim); United States
v. Musto, 540 F. Supp. 346,350-51 (D.N.J. 1982) (allowing a standing claim under the Sixth
Amendment, but denying it for equal protection and due process claims when the
defendant is not a member of the excluded class), affd sub nom. United States v. Aimone,
715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Leonetti, 291 F. Supp. 461, 473 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (ruling that the defendant must be a member of the excluded group to raise equal
protection objections); Heaton v. State, 350 S.E.2d 480, 482 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
the same); Simon v. State, 679 So. 2d 617, 621 (Miss. 1996) (holding the same); People v.
Wells, 454 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (App. Div. 1982) (allowing standing for a Sixth Amendment
fair cross-section claim but denying it for an equal protection claim).
The Supreme Court has held that the defendant does not have to be a member of the
excluded class to challenge discrimination when that challenge is based on the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee to a trial by a fair cross-section of the community. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VI; see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1976) (allowing a
male defendant to challenge the exclusion of women from his petit jury in a state criminal
trial); Haley, 924 F.2d at 739 (allowing standing on Sixth Amendment grounds); United
States v. Abell, 552 F. Supp. 316, 318-19 (D. Me. 1982) (same). Campbell raised a Sixth
Amendment challenge on certiorari to the Supreme Court, but the Court would not
entertain the challenge because it had not been addressed by the Louisiana Supreme
Court or the Louisiana Court of Appeal. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1425. Thus, the
Court had to address Campbell's standing based on his equal protection and due process
claims rather than on his fair cross-section claim. See id.
29. See Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 29 (1997).
30. See id at 1421. Campbell also asserted a violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair
cross-section requirement, but the Court dismissed this claim as not being properly
preserved on appeal. See id- at 1425; see also supra note 28 (discussing the fair cross-
section requirement).
31. See Brief on the Merits for Petitioner at 14, Campbell (No. 96-1584).
32. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1422.
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have been chosen.33 Thus, if discrimination plays a role in the
selection of the foreperson, discrimination necessarily will taint the
composition of the grand jury itself.M In other jurisdictions, by
contrast, the foreperson is selected from the ranks of the already
seated grand jurors. In theory, using this method of selection, the
grand jury could be selected constitutionally, with discrimination
affecting only the choice of the foreperson.3 6
In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy,37 the Court held that
33. See LA. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 413(B) (West 1991); see also 1 SARA SUN
BEALE ETAL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACrICE § 4:6, at 4-22 n.11 (2d ed. 1997) (stating
that Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Virginia use procedures similar to that of
Louisiana).
34. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1422. This fact is true because a member of the grand
jury has been selected to sit on the grand jury based on unconstitutional discrimination.
By selecting the foreperson from the venire rather than from the grand jury after all of its
members have been selected, the judge is including a member in the grand jury who might
not have been selected but for the discrimination. Also, the judge is excluding African-
Americans in the venire from an equal chance of receiving one of the 12 positions on the
grand jury. By selecting one person unconstitutionally, the judge allows African-
Americans only the chance to fill 11 of the seats in the grand jury rather than the 12 seats
the whites in the venire have the chance to fill. See id.; see also Transcript of Oral
Argument, Campbell (No. 96-1584), available in 1998 WL 27944, at *30-*33 (Jan. 20, 1998)
(questioning how discrimination against African-Americans by excluding them from one-
twelfth of all grand jury positions is any different than other types of systematic
discrimination). In states that do not randomly select the remainder of the grand jury, an
additional argument could be made that if discrimination tainted the selection of the
foreperson, it easily could have affected the selection of other jurors as well. This
argument is not a viable one in Campbell, however, because the grand jury is randomly
selected after the foreperson is chosen.
35. See 1 BEALE ET AL., supra note 33, at 4-20 to 4-21. The foreperson in Louisiana is
not only selected differently than in other jurisdictions, but she also is given more powers
than forepersons in some other jurisdictions. Compare LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts.
435,444 (West 1991), and Transcript of Oral Argument, Campbell (No. 96-1584), available
in 1998 WL 27944, at *22, *25 (Jan. 20, 1998), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(c) (granting only
ministerial, or clerical, powers to the foreperson in federal cases), and OHIO R. CRIM. P.
6(c) (granting ministerial powers, such as signing the indictment and administering the
oath, to the foreperson). In Louisiana, the foreperson has full voting powers equal to all
the other members of the grand jury. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1422. In addition to his
voting power, the foreperson in Louisiana also has various ministerial duties. See
Transcript of Oral Argument, Campbell (No. 96-1584), available in 1998 WL 27944, at *22
(Jan. 20,1998).
36. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1422. In other words, everyone in the venire had an
equal opportunity to be placed on the grand jury. The discrimination affected solely the
choice of who would serve as foreperson.
37. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1421. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. Justice Thomas,
who was joined by Justice Scalia, dissented as to Part III of the Court's opinion, which
concerned Campbell's third-party standing. See id. at 1426 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 1422. Justice Kennedy also wrote the majority opinions for
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), which granted third-party standing to a white
defendant to challenge peremptory strikes of African-American jurors, and Edmonson v.
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Campbell had standing to object on both equal protection and due
process grounds to the exclusion of African-Americans from his
grand jury, even though he was not a member of the excluded
group." Thus, the Court recognized Campbell's third-party standing
to raise equal protection claims based on the rights of the excluded
jurors.39 The Court also held that Campbell had standing to raise his
own due process objections to racial discrimination on his grand
jury.4 The Court did not define the nature or extent of Campbell's
due process protections;41 rather, it merely held that he had such
standing under the Fifth Amendment.4'
In its analysis, the Campbell Court relied on Powers v. Ohio,43 a
case decided seven years before Campbell, in which the Court had
synthesized prior case law and developed a three-prong test to
determine whether third-party standing should be granted.
According to Powers, a defendant claiming discrimination in the
selection of his petit jury" must show: (1) injury-in-fact; (2) a close
relationship between himself and the excluded juror(s); and (3) an
obstacle to the third person in bringing the claim herself.45 The
Campbell Court extended this three-prong test to the context of
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), which extended the rule of Powers to civil
litigants. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's views on jury service, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Justice Kennedy and the Ideal of Equality, 28 PAC. L.J. 515,523-25 (1997).
38. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1421.
39. See id. The traditional equal protection argument with respect to jury selection is
that a defendant has the right for members of his race not to be excluded from service.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880) (stating that if a white man has the
right to be tried by a jury free from racial discrimination against those of his race, then
equal protection requires the same right for an African-American defendant). In cases
like Campbell, the Court must grapple with the conceptual difficulty of whether a
defendant can claim that his right to equal protection under the law has been violated
when members of a different race are excluded from his jury. See supra note 28
(demonstrating the difficulty lower courts have had in addressing this issue). In such a
situation, the defendant suffers no discrimination or classification based on his race. See,
e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 497 n.4 (1972) (plurality opinion) (discussing the "same
class" rule). To get around this difficulty, the Campbell Court granted the defendant
third-party standing so that he could assert the excluded jurors' rights to equal protection
under the law-that is, the right not to be excluded from jury service due to race. See
Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1421.
40. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1424-25.
41. See id. at 1424.
42- See id. at 1424-25.
43. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
44. A petit jury is "[t]he ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action; so
called to distinguish it from the grand jury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (6th ed.
1990).
45. See id. at 411; see also infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text (discussing the
Powers test).
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grand juror discrimination.46 As in Powers, the Campbell Court was
concerned that discrimination has the potential to undermine every
facet of the judicial system.47 In applying each stage of the test,48 the
Court noted the harm that will come to the judicial system if
discrimination infects any of the processes within it.
49
In applying the Powers test to the selection of grand jurors, the
Campbell Court focused on the central role of the grand jury in the
criminal justice system °.5  "The grand jury, like the petit jury 'acts as a
vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State and its
prosecutors.' "I' The grand jury also makes significant decisions
about whether to indict, how many charges to bring against a
defendant, and which charges to bring against a defendant. The
Campbell Court held that injury-in-fact had been established because
the fairness of all of these decisions is called into question any time
discrimination taints the selection process.5 3 It held that the closeness
requirement enunciated in Powers was met in Campbell due to the
excluded grand jurors' and the defendant's "common interest in
eradicating discrimination from the grand jury selection process."5 4
Finally, the third prong of the Powers test was satisfied in Campbell
because "excluded grand jurors have the same economic
disincentives to assert their own rights as do excluded petit jurors. '" 55
After establishing the applicability of the Powers test to the
grand jury context, and thus allowing Campbell third-party standing
to assert his claim of discrimination, the Court reversed the Louisiana
Supreme Court's decision to deny Campbell standing to assert his
claim of discrimination.56 It did not reverse Campbell's conviction. 7
Instead, it remanded the case to determine if any discrimination
actually occurred. 8
46. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1423.
47. See id. ("If [the grand jury selection process] is infected with racial discrimination,
doubt is cast over the fairness of all subsequent decisions."); Powers, 499 U.S. at 411-12.
48. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1423-24; Powers, 499 U.S. at 412-14.
49. Particular concerns included the excluded jurors' perceptions of the system; the
public's perception of the integrity of the system; the convicted defendant's perception of
the fairness of the system; and the perception of integrity and fairness on the part of those
selected to serve as jurors. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1423; Powers, 499 U.S. at 412-14.
50. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1423.
51. Id. (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 411).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 1424.
55. Id.
56. See id at 1425.
57. See id. at 1425-26.
58. See id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, Campbell (No. 96-1584), available
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Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the
judgment, but dissented as to the Court's application of third-party
standing in this context.5 9 As an initial matter, he noted that Powers
should be overruled because it "distorted standing principles and
equal protection law."'  Even accepting the principles of Powers,
Justice Thomas argued that the Powers test on its own terms could
not be satisfied in Campbell's situation and was not appropriately
applied by the majority.6' One of his primary concerns in regard to
the majority's application of the Powers test was the treatment of
injury-in-fact. 62 While Justice Thomas would require injury-in-fact to
be suffered by the defendant,63 the majority believed that the injury
was the harm to the judicial system. 4  This disagreement
demonstrates the reach of the majority opinion. Justice Thomas
disapproved of the majority's expanding view of injury-in-fact and
would instead conduct a particularized analysis of third-party
standing based on the facts of each case, analyzing the harm to each
defendant.6  For Justice Thomas, the majority's emphasis on the
harm to the judicial system provides a broad test that any defendant
could satisfy.66
in 1998 WL 27944 at *21-*22 (Jan. 20, 1998) (indicating that the Court was only deciding
the standing issue, and it was up to the Louisiana state courts to determine if
discrimination had in fact occurred).
59. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1426 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
60. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. See id. at 1427 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Even if the
Powers justifications were persuasive, they would still be wholly inapplicable to this case
62. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Injury-in-fact refers
to the litigant's ability to show "an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical.'" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations
omitted); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.2, at 58-72 (2d
ed. 1994) (discussing in depth the nature of the injury as required by the Court). In Lujan,
the Court referred to the injury requirement as an "irreducible constitutional minimum."
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. For an argument that injury-in-fact was judicially constructed and
is not constitutionally required, see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of
Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 170-79 (1992). For a
further discussion of the injury requirement, see infra notes 152, 191-219 and
accompanying text.
63. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1427-28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
64. See id. at 1423-24.
65. See id. at 1427-28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. See id. (Thomas, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 1423-
24 (discussing the harm to the judicial system that results from racial discrimination in jury
selection).
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Third-party standing-the issue in Campbell-is a prudential
limitation 67 within the general justiciability doctrine 6  of standing.
The doctrine of standing is concerned with whether a litigant is the
proper person to bring an issue before the court and, thus, whether
the court has the power to adjudicate the particular dispute. To
obtain standing, a litigant must satisfy the constitutional
requirements of Article III, which defines the scope of the federal
judiciary's power to hear disputes.70  The Supreme Court has
interpreted these constitutional prerequisites to require proof of
three elements:71 injury-in-fact, 72 causation,73 and redressability.74
67. "Prudential" refers to judicial self-restraint, or judicial self-governance, as opposed
to jurisdictional limitations on the Court. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 US. 490, 509 (1975);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). One commentator explains the concept of
prudential limitations as follows: "[Ajlthough the Constitution permits federal court
adjudication, the Court has decided that in certain instances wise policy militates against
judicial review. These justiciability doctrines are termed 'prudential.' " CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 62, § 2.1, at 38.
68. The justiciability doctrines include prohibitions against issuing advisory opinions
and deciding political questions, as well as standing, ripeness, and mootness
considerations. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 62, § 2.1, at 42 ("The justiciability
doctrines determine which matters federal courts can hear and decide and which must be
dismissed.").
69. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498; see also Baker v. Cam 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962) (stating
that the "gist of standing" is whether the litigants have a sufficiently personal stake in the
outcome of the dispute); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 62, § 2.3.1 at 53-54 (defining
standing).
70. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Baker, 369 U.S. at 204 (stating the constitutional
requirement that federal courts hear only actual controversies).
71. See Northeastern Fla. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663 (1993); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984).
72. The injury must be "particularized" or "demonstrable" through "specific, concrete
facts." Warth, 422 U.S. at 508; see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177
(1974) (stating that the injury must be "particular and concrete"); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S.
1, 14 (1972) (stating that the injury must be "specific and objective").
Article III defines the constitutional scope of the federal judiciary's power to hear
disputes, limiting it to cases or controversies. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Baker, 369 U.S.
at 204 (stating the constitutional requirement that federal courts hear only actual
controversies). The result of the case or controversy requirement is that federal courts
hear only those cases in which there has been or will be an injury. See Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (requiring some actual or
threatened injury to satisfy the Article III standing requirement).
The injury can be direct or indirect, but it is more difficult for an indirect injury to
satisfy this Article III test. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 505 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
124 (1973)). In Warth, plaintiffs alleged that a town's zoning laws prevented developers
from building housing for low and moderate income people. Without such housing, low
and moderate income people such as the plaintiffs were effectively prohibited from
moving to the town. See id. at 493-95. The Court denied standing in Warti, however,
explaining that the plaintiffs had failed to "allege facts from which it reasonably could be
inferred that, absent [the town's] restrictive zoning practices, there [was] a substantial
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After a litigant satisfies the constitutional prerequisites of
Article III, the litigant may still face prudential limitations that have
been articulated by the Court.' One of these limitations is the
general rule against a litigant's invoking the constitutional rights or
immunities of third persons.76 Such a limitation is designed to restrict
access to federal courts because of concerns regarding separation of
powers,77 scarce judicial resources, 8 and unnecessary constitutional
probability that they would have been able to purchase or lease" in the town. Id. at 504.
Moreover, the plaintiffs did not show how striking down the zoning laws, which applied to
developers, would provide them with relief. See id. The Court contrasted the plaintiffs in
Warth with other plaintiffs who had successfully obtained standing, explaining that the
successful "plaintiffs challenged zoning restrictions as applied to particular projects that
would supply housing within their means, and of which they were intended residents." IcL
at 507 (emphasis added).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), provides an example of an indirect injury that was
sufficient. Roe challenged a Texas statute criminalizing the behavior of doctors who
administered abortions on the ground that the statute had an impact on her ability to
obtain an abortion. See id. at 117-18. Her injury was sufficient for Article III purposes,
even though the statute did not threaten to criminalize her actions. See id. at 124.
73. Causation requires a determination of whether the defendant's actions caused the
asserted injury. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750; Warth, 422 U.S. at 505; see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 62, § 2.3.3, at 72-73 (discussing causation).
74. Redressability refers to whether the relief sought will remedy the harm. See
Allen, 468 U.S. at 750; Warth, 422 U.S. at 505; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 62,
§ 2.3.3, at 72-73 (discussing redressability). Earlier cases held that redressability and
causation were a single requirement for standing purposes. See Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,74 (1978); CHARLES ALAN WRIGI-T, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 68 n.43 (4th ed. 1983). In Allen, the Court made it clear
that these were distinct and independent prerequisites for standing. See Allen, 468 U.S. at
753 n.19.
75. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500 (distinguishing these matters of "judicial self
governance" from the constitutional mandates of Article III); Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249,257 (1953) (describing the limits to third-party standing as a "rule of practice," as
opposed to a constitutional requirement).
76. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (per curiam) (denying a
physician the right to assert the claims of his patients when the physician claimed that a
statute forbidding him from giving them advice regarding conception would endanger
their lives). But see Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976) (discussing this general
rule and the policy reasons underlying it); Barrows, 346 U.S. at 255 (granting third-party
standing to a realtor to assert the unconstitutionality of a restrictive covenant that
adversely affected the equal protection rights of non-Caucasian purchasers of land); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (granting standing to private schools to assert
the rights of parents and guardians to decide where to send their children to school).
77. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500; Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 222 (1974); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 62, § 2.3, at,55 (discussing the
values served by limiting standing); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 890-99 (1983)
(discussing the value of limiting standing to preserve the separation of powers).
78. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 62, § 2.3, at 55-56 (discussing the value of
preventing a flood of lawsuits and conserving political capital by limiting standing).
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adjudications. 79 Also, the Court has noted that courts "should prefer
to construe legal rights only when the most effective advocates of
those rights are before them." 0 Generally, an assumption exists that
the person suffering the harm at issue will be the best proponent of
his own legal rights.81
Because standing is a prudential limitation rather than a
constitutional one, however, the Court may make exceptions to its
own rule. When countervailing policy considerations outweigh the
Court's reluctance to hear claims asserted by a proponent of a third
party's rights, the Court may grant what is known as "third-party
standing."'  Yet even if policy considerations allow a litigant to
assert the rights of a third party, the litigant before the Court still has
the burden of showing a "distinct and palpable injury" to herself. 83 In
other words, the litigant must still meet the requirements for Article
III standing.
A review of prior third-party standing decisions leading up to
Campbell helps clarify the Court's prudential standing requirements.
In Singleton v. Wulff,' two Missouri-licensed physicians challenged
the constitutionality of a Missouri statute excluding Medicaid
79. See Wulff, 428 U.S. at 113-14; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1960);
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 62, § 2.3, at 53-56 (discussing the policies underlying standing
regarding judicial efficiency and the conservation of political capital). This desire not to
engage in unnecessary constitutional adjudications stems from concerns regarding judicial
efficiency and separation of powers. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-
60 (1992) (discussing the central role of standing questions in the preservation of
separation of powers); CHEMERiNsKY, supra note 62, § 2.3, at 55 (discussing the values
served by limiting standing).
80. Wulff, 428 U.S. at 114.
81. See id.
82. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500-01 ("In some circumstances, countervailing
considerations may outweigh the concerns underlying the usual reluctance to exert judicial
power when the plaintiff's claim to relief rests on the legal rights of third parties.");
Raines, 362 U.S. at 22-24 (discussing various policy considerations that lead the Court to
apply the third-party standing doctrine, such as when application of traditional standing
rules would inhibit freedom of speech); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953)
("Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons which underlie our
rule denying standing to raise another's rights, which is only a rule of practice, are
outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights which would be denied. .. ").
83. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1976)
(stating that the Article III constitutional prerequisites must still be satisfied for third-
party standing); Wulff, 428 U.S. at 113-14 (same); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 62, § 2.3.4, at
81-82 (stating that the person asserting the rights of third parties must meet the
constitutional standing requirements in addition to satisfying prudential third-party
standing concerns).
84. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
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benefits for abortions that were not medically required."5 The
doctors sought to assert their own rights to perform abortions, as well
as those of their patients to receive proper medical advice and
treatment. 6 The Supreme Court allowed the physicians to assert the
rights of their patients "as against governmental interference with the
abortion decision. '' s
The Court in Wulff noted that if injury-in-fact can be shown for
jurisdictional (that is, constitutional) purposes, two elements
determine whether the general rule prohibiting litigants from
asserting the claims of third parties should apply." The first element
is whether the litigant has a sufficiently close relationship to the
person whose rights he seeks to assert.8 9 This element ensures that
the adjudication of the issue is necessary, in that the third party will
be able to benefit from the outcome of the suit.90 A sufficiently close
relationship also ensures effective advocacy from the third-party
litigant.91
The second element is whether the third party is able to assert
his own rights.92 In support of this element, the Court noted that
there are reasons to require a person to assert his own rights, even if
the element of closeness is met in a particular case.93 If that person is
unable to assert his own rights, however, some of the rationales
behind the prohibition of third-party standing, such as concerns
regarding unwanted intervention or effective advocacy, begin to lose
their force. 94  The Justices have differed as to what constitutes a
85. See id. at 109-10.
86. See id- at 110.
87. Id at 118.
88. See id. at 113-14.
89. See id. at 114-15.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 115; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973) (holding that the
nature of the doctor-patient relationship is sufficient to allow doctors to assert the rights
of their patients); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972) (stressing the
"advocate" relationship and the "impact of the litigation on the third-party interests");
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (holding that the confidential nature of
the relationship between the litigants and the third persons ensured effective advocacy and
preservation of the third persons' rights).
92 See Wulff, 428 U.S. at 115-16.
93. See id. at 116 ("Even where the relationship is close, the reasons for requiring
persons to assert their own rights will generally still apply."); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (stating the test as requiring all three elements: closeness, obstacle,
and injury). But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 62, § 2.3.4, at 82-88 (discussing closeness
and obstacles faced by a third party in asserting his own claim as independent exceptions
to the rule against allowing third-party standing).
94. See Wulff, 428 U.S. at 116 ("If there is some genuine obstacle ... the third party's
absence from court loses its tendency to suggest that his right is not truly at stake, or truly
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sufficient obstacle to satisfy this element, however.95
The Court's refusal to grant third-party standing when no
obstacle exists for the third person to assert his own claims was
illustrated in McGowan v. Maryland.96 In McGowan, the appellants
were indicted for selling various products on Sunday, 97 subjecting
them to criminal penalties under Maryland's Sunday closing laws. 98
The appellants argued that the Sunday closing laws violated
constitutional guarantees to freedom of religion for certain other
parties and that the appellants, as affected third parties, suffered
resulting economic harm.99 The Court denied third-party standing on
this issue,1"' holding that the appellants did not allege sufficient
countervailing policy considerations to justify abandonment of the
important to him, and the party who is in court becomes by default the right's best
available proponent.").
95. See id. at 126 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[S]uch an
assertion is proper, not when there is merely some 'obstacle' to the rightholder's own
litigation, but when such litigation is in all practicable terms impossible."); see also Henry
P. Monaghan, Third-Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 288 (1984) (describing how
what constitutes an obstacle has changed over time, with the Court now focusing less on
the actual ability of the third party to assert his claim).
96. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
97. The products they sold were a three-ring loose-leaf binder, a can of floor wax, a
stapler, staples, and a toy submarine. See idL at 422.
98. These "blue laws" have since been repealed. See MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27 § 492
(1957) (prohibiting work on Sundays) (repealed 1992); id. § 509 (forbidding the operation
of various recreational activities on Sundays) (repealed 1980); id. § 521 (forbidding the
sale of various merchandise on Sundays) (repealed 1992); id. § 522 (prohibiting the
opening of barber shops and bowling alleys, among other things, on Sundays) (repealed
1992). They were each fined five dollars plus court costs for selling merchandise in
violation of state law. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 422,424.
99. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 429.
100. In analyzing the appellants' claim that the laws violated the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of religion, the Court had to look to third-party standing principles
because the appellants alleged that they suffered only economic harm, rather than any
impairment of their own religious practices. See id. The Court apparently ignored the fact
that the appellants themselves were subject to criminal penalties. See id. at 424. The
Court has denied third-party standing in other cases in which the state has criminalized the
litigant's conduct, thus arguably causing a direct injury to the litigant. This type of denial
often occurs in cases in which a defendant seeks third-party standing to exclude evidence
obtained in the illegal search of some third party. The Supreme Court justifies this rule on
the principle that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, and thus can not be
asserted by a third party. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980);
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34
(1978); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963). In McGowan, however, the appellants were
asserting the First Amendment, rather than Fourth Amendment, rights of third parties.
See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 429.
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general rule that litigants cannot assert claims of a third party.'' The
Court noted that if a person's religious freedom had been impaired
because of the Sunday closing statutes, no obstacle existed to prevent
that person from bringing his own claim."°
In deciding Campbell, the Court relied most heavily on its
decision in Powers v. Ohio"°3 due to the similarity of the facts in the
two cases. In Powers, a white defendant challenged the exclusion of
African-American jurors from his petit jury through the use of
peremptory strikes."° The defendant's claim rested on the third-
party equal protection claims of the jurors excluded by the
prosecution because of race.0 5 The Court held that a defendant
could challenge race-based exclusion of jurors through peremptory
strikes, regardless of whether the defendant and the excluded jurors
share the same race'. 6
In Powers, the Court consolidated the principles of prior third-
party standing cases and formulated a three-prong test.10 7 Once the
litigant meets the three-prong test, he fits into the limited exception
to the general rule forbidding a litigant from asserting a third-party
claim.' The three-prong test requires the litigant to show: a distinct
perceptible injury to himself; a close relationship to the third party;
and some obstacle to the third party's ability to bring a claim for
101. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 430.
102. See id.
103. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
104. Powers was on trial for murder. See id. at 402. During the selection of his jury,
Powers objected when the prosecutor exercised his first peremptory challenge to remove
an African-American and requested the trial court to compel the prosecutor to explain, on
the record, his reasons for excluding the African-American. See id. at 403. The trial court
denied the request and excused the juror. See id. Out of the nine subsequent preemptory
challenges used by the State, it used six to exclude African-Americans. See id. Each time
the prosecution challenged an African-American prospective juror, Powers renewed his
objections. See id.
105. See id. at 416.
106. See id. at 415. Compare this holding with the holding in Holland v. United States,
493 U.S. 474 (1990), which was decided while the petition for certiorari for Powers was
pending. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 403. In Holland, the Court held that a white defendant
had standing under the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement to challenge the
exclusion of African-Americans from his jury. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 476. The Court
held, however, that the exclusion of a racial group through peremptory strikes does not
violate the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 487. Five Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy) agreed that this type of exclusion would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, 'but the question of
standing under the Fourteenth Amendment was still left open by the Court. See id. at 488
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 490 (Marshall, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); id.
at 504 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 410-11.
108. See WRIGHT, supra, note 74, § at 68.
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To establish injury-in-fact, the Court in Powers focused on the
"overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel," of allowing a
prosecutor's wrongful exclusion of a juror by a race-based
peremptory challenge."0 The Court distinguished this constitutional
violation, which occurs during the trial itself, from constitutional
violations that occur before trial when discussing the harm to the
defendant."' This constitutional violation, by occurring in open
court, "casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and
indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial."'1 2 Thus,
the defendant may receive an unfair trial because the trier of fact
now has a diminished respect for the law."
3
The Powers Court held that the second requirement-
closeness-also was satisfied because of the nature of voir dire, which
"permits a party to establish a relation, if not a bond of trust, with the
jurors ... [that] continues throughout the entire trial and may in
some cases extend to the sentencing as well.""14  Finally, the third
prong of the test was satisfied because of the many difficulties that
individual excluded jurors would have in bringing their own claims. 115
Powers highlights a trend in the Court's extension of third-party
standing principles, but it also demonstrates the Court's sensitivity to
109. Id.
110. Powers, 499 U.S. at 412. The Court focused on the injury to the defendant, the
excluded jurors, and the public's perception of the jury system. See id. at 412-13; see also
Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Public Confidence in the
Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1177, 1182-86
(1994) (discussing the impact of a representative jury on the community's and the jurors'
perceptions of fairness in the court system); Bradley R. Kirk, Note, Milking the New
Sacred Cow: The Supreme Court Limits the Peremptory Challenge on Racial Grounds in
Powers v. Ohio and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 19 PEPP. L. REv. 691, 706-08
(1992) (discussing the Powers Court's treatment of the injury-in-fact requirement).
111. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 412. For examples of constitutional violations that occur
before trial, see supra note 100.
112. Powers, 499 U.S. at 412.
113. See id. at 412-13.
114. Id. at 413; see also Kirk, supra note 110, at 708-10 (noting that the Court focused
on the closeness of the remaining jurors to the defendant, rather than the relationship of
the excluded jurors to the defendant).
115. The Court noted that potential jurors cannot object at the time of their exclusion,
and that it would be difficult to get prospective relief because of an inability to show a
likelihood of future personal discrimination. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 414-15. In addition,
the Court noted that the "small financial stake involved and the economic burdens of
litigation" are additional hurdles. Id. at 1415; see also Hon. Thomas A. Hett, Batson v.
Kentucky: Present Extensions and Future Applications, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 413, 424-25
(1993) (discussing the Court's application of the Powers three-prong test in Georgia v.
McCollum).
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racial discrimination in the court system." 6 Powers was actually an
extension of Batson v. Kentucky,"7 a case decided five years earlier,
in which the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
gives an African-American defendant the right to challenge
peremptory strikes used to exclude African-Americans from the
defendant's petit jury."' The Court in Batson acknowledged the
harm to the community that comes when discrimination occurs
within the judicial system."9  This harm, the Court believed,
outweighed the benefits that come from allowing the prosecutor
unbridled discretion in exercising peremptory challenges. 20
The Supreme Court's concern about racial discrimination within
the court system is a longstanding one, dating from its 1880 decision
in Strauder v. West Virginia.2' In Strauder, the Court reversed a
defendant's state court conviction because African-Americans were
excluded from the grand jury that returned an indictment against that
defendant. 22 The Court stated that this kind of exclusion from either
a grand or petit jury violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." The rationale behind granting African-
Americans an equal protection claim in this context was that whites
receive trials by juries selected from persons of their own race, so
African-Americans should be allowed the same opportunity.24 Over
the next several years, the Court repeatedly held that an African-
American has the right to be indicted by a grand jury free from racial
discrimination."z
116. The importance of Powers was enhanced by Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614 (1991), which extended the rule of Powers to civil litigants. See i. at 630.
117. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
118. See id. at 89.
119. See id. at 85-88.
120. See id. at 98-99. For a thorough discussion of Batson, see Coburn R. Beck, The
Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 961, 967-68 (1998);
Justice Hugh Maddox, Batson: From an Appellate Judge's Viewpoint, 54 ALA. LAW. 316
(1993); Beckley, supra note 2, at 285-302; Fried, supra note 3, at 1313-19.
121. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
122. See id. at 310, 312.
123. See id. at 309-10.
124. See id. at 309. The Court enunciated the argument as follows: Deliberate
exclusion of African-Americans "is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an
assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment
to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all
others." Id. at 308.
125. See Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 259 (1904) (reversing and remanding a
murder conviction because the defendant was not given the opportunity to challenge the
exclusion of African-Americans from his grand jury); Carter v. Texas, 117 U.S. 442, 447-49
(1900) (holding unconstitutional the indictment of a defendant who was denied the
opportunity to challenge the racial composition of the grand jury); Bush v. Kentucky, 107
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In Pierre v. Louisiana,26 the Supreme Court for the first time
analyzed a Louisiana parish's practice of selecting a grand jury. In
Pierre, the African-American defendant presented evidence that,
despite the fact that one-third of the population of the parish where
he was charged was African-American, his grand jury venire
contained the names of no African-American citizens."l 7 The Court
held that this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate racial
discrimination in the selection of both the grand jury and the petit
jury.-2
In Patton v. Mississippi,129 the Court observed that evidence of
the long, continued, unexplained absence of African-Americans from
jury panels is proof of discrimination. In Patton, an all-white jury
convicted the African-American defendant and sentenced him to
death.3 ' He produced evidence that no African-Americans had
served on a grand or petit jury in Lauderdale County, Mississippi, in
at least thirty years.' Though the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled
that the lack of an African-American in the county's grand juries for
more than thirty years was irrelevant in determining whether
systematic racial discrimination had occurred, 32 the U.S. Supreme
Court disagreed and reversed the conviction. 3  The Court noted that
"[w]hen a jury selection plan, whatever it is, operates in such way as
always to result in the complete and long-continued exclusion of any
representative at all from a large group of [African-Americans], or
any other racial group, indictments and verdicts returned against
them by juries thus selected cannot stand.' 3
In later decisions, the Court held that once a defendant has made
a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the burden shifts to the
State to rebut the inference. 35 The Court reiterated this approach in
U.S. 110, 121-23 (1883) (reversing and remanding a murder conviction due to the exclusion
of African-Americans from the grand jury).
126. 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
127. See id. at 355. This evidence was not rebutted by the State. See id.
128. See id. at 361-62.
129. 332 U.S. 463 (1947). The unanimous opinion was authored by Justice Black. See
id. at 464. Future-Justice Thurgood Marshall argued for Patton. See id.
130. See id. at 464. The defendant had been indicted by an all-white grand jury. See id.
131. See id.
132- See id. at 467; Patton v. State, 29 So. 2d 96, 98-99 (Miss. 1947).
133. See Patton, 332 U.S. at 466.
134. Id. at 469.
135. See, e.g., Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 24-25 (1969) (reversing the defendant's
murder conviction because the Georgia Supreme Court improperly relied on the
presumption that the jury commissioners properly executed their duties in eliminating
possible jurors); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 551 (1967) (reversing the convictions of
defendants when the State did not sufficiently rebut the inference of discrimination);
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Castaneda v. Partida,1" 6  in which a Texas prisoner alleged
discrimination against Mexican-Americans in the selection of the
grand jury that had indicted him. 37 The defendant introduced
evidence that from 1962 to 1972, the average percentage of the
county's population was 79.1% Mexican-American, while the average
percentage of Mexican-American grand jurors was 39%.138 The
Court established this method for proving racial discrimination as
"'the rule of exclusion.' ,139 The defendant must show that he is part
of a distinct class, and he must show that this particular class has been
substantially underrepresented over a period of time. 40  The
defendant's statistics in Partida were sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination.' 41 The Court held that the State
did not sufficiently rebut the inference of discrimination established
by the defendant's evidence, and therefore upheld the lower court's
decision that the defendant had been denied equal protection in the
selection of his grand jury. 42
Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773, 774 (1964) (per curiam) (holding that the
testimony concerning a discrepancy between the number of African-Americans in the
county as compared with the number called for jury service established a prima facie case
of discrimination).
136. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
137. See id. at 483-84.
138. See id. at 486-87.
139. Id. at 494 (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1954)). The Court
explained the rule of exclusion by stating, "If a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is
unlikely that it is due solely to chance or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, one must conclude that racial or other class-related factors entered into the
selection process." Id at 494 n.13 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.13 (1977)); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241
(1976) (stating that a prima facie case of discrimination may be established by
demonstrating the absence of African-Americans in jury pools); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356
U.S. 584, 587 (1958) (holding that the "uniform and long-continued exclusion" of African-
Americans from grand juries in the county was sufficient evidence of discrimination);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131 (1940) ("Chance and accident alone could hardly have
brought about the listing for grand jury service of so few [African-Americans] from among
the thousands shown by the undisputed evidence to possess the legal qualifications for jury
service.").
140. The Court stated the test as follows:
The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct
class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied.
Next, the degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the
proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve
as grand jurors, over a significant period of time.
Partida, 430 U.S. at 494 (citing Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478-80; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587, 591 (1935)).
141. See id. at 496. For a discussion of the use of statistics in death penalty cases, see
infra note 250.
142. See Partida, 430 U.S. at 501.
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The Court first addressed a white defendant's challenge to the
exclusion of African-Americans from jury service in Peters v. Kiff.
a43
In Peters, the defendant claimed that African-Americans "were
systematically excluded" from both the grand and petit juries. 144 The
Court held that the defendant's conviction could not stand if his
claims of discrimination were valid.145 The Justices could not resolve,
however, the issue of the grounds on which the defendant could bring
the claim. 4 6 The fact that a white defendant complained of
discrimination against African-Americans in jury selection led three
Justices to argue that the harmless-error 47 analysis should apply.
148
In the lower courts, Peters had been "precluded from proving the
facts alleged in support of his claim" of discrimination.149 Thus, the
Court remanded to allow him to do so.' ° It explicitly stated that if
his allegations were proven true, his conviction could not stand.' If
a majority of the Peters Court had adopted the harmless error
argument, 52 this would mean that the defendant's conviction would
143. 407 U.S. 493 (1972). Peters was convicted of burglary by a jury in Muscogee
County, Georgia. See id. at 494 (plurality opinion). His first conviction was reversed on
Fourth Amendment grounds. See Peters v. State, 152 S.E.2d 647, 648 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
He alleged discrimination in jury selection after his second conviction. See Peters, 407
U.S. at 494 n.1 (plurality opinion).
144. Peters, 407 U.S. at 497 (plurality opinion).
145. See id. at 505-07 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
146. Compare id. at 502 (plurality opinion) (stating that a white defendant can establish
a claim on due process grounds), with id. at 505-07 (White, J., concurring in the judgment)
(stating that a white defendant has a claim on statutory grounds, rather than due process
grounds). None of the Justices accepted Peters's equal protection argument, however.
See id. at 494 (plurality opinion) (stating that Peters raised a Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection objection); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 421 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
case [Peters v. Kiff produced no majority opinion, but it is significant that no Justice
relied upon the petitioner's equal protection argument.").
147. Harmless error refers to the idea that an appellate court should only reverse a trial
court if the trial court's mistake affected a substantial right of the defendant's. See David
McCord, The "Trial"/"Structural" Error Dichotomy: Erroneous, and Not Harmless, 45 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1403-07 (1997) (discussing the meaning and history of harmless error).
148. See Peters, 407 U.S. at 508 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, who
joined Chief Justice Burger's dissenting view in Peters that the harmless-error analysis
should apply, see id. at 507 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), changed his position in Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), joining the majority in upholding the automatic reversal rule,
see Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263. The difference between these two cases is that in Peters, a
white defendant alleged discrimination against African-American jurors, whereas in
Hillery, an African-American defendant alleged discrimination against African-American
jurors.
149. Peters, 407 U.S. at 505.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. The argument specifically was that even if the grand and petit juries were selected
in a discriminatory fashion, Peters was not harmed by this error; therefore, his conviction
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not have been overturned.153 Application of the harmless error rule
thus would negate the imposition of the automatic reversal ruleY.
5 4
The traditional remedy for discrimination in the selection of
grand jurors has been automatic reversal. 55 For years, the Court has
uniformly held that sufficient proof of discrimination in the selection
of jurors mandates that the conviction be set aside and that the
indictment returned by the unconstitutionally composed grand jury
be quashed.5 6 The question of whether the harmless-error standard,
instead of automatic reversal, should apply when discrimination has
been proved in the context of a grand jury was first discussed in a
dissent by Justice Jackson in Cassell v. Texas. 7  The majority in
Cassell reversed Cassell's murder conviction based on the exclusion
of African-Americans from his grand jury. 8  Justice Jackson
enunciated the argument for harmless-error review in the context of
grand juries by pointing to the lack of prejudice the defendant
suffered.'59 He noted that the harm a defendant suffers in the context
of petit jury selection is very different from the harm suffered in
grand jury selection.16 The petit jury is the ultimate trier of fact, and
discrimination in this context can affect the fairness of the
should not be overturned. See Peters, 407 U.S. at 498 (plurality opinion). The argument
for harmless error follows from the Court's prior characterizations of the injury suffered
when the selection of jurors is tainted by discrimination. The argument up to the time of
Peters was that the defendant suffered an injury because the jury, which excluded
members of the defendant's own group, would be prejudiced against him. See id. Because
Peters was not a member of the excluded group, the argument was put forth that he did
not suffer any prejudice, and therefore did not suffer any harm from the discrimination.
See id.
153. See Rebecca Horton, Note, South Carolina Adopts a Harmless Error Rule for
Cases Involving Government Intimidation of Witnesses, 49 S.C. L. REv. 1143, 1145 (1998).
154. See id. at 1144-47 (discussing differences between harmless error analysis and per
se rules of reversal).
155. See Hillery, 474 U.S. at 266 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring in the judgment); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942).
156. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 628, 633-34 (1972); Arnold v.
North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773, 774 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 589 (1958);
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 88-90 (1955); Cassell, 339 U.S. at 240; Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 132 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 362 (1939); Rogers v. Alabama, 192
U.S. 226, 231 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447-49 (1900); Bush v. Kentucky, 107
U.S. 110, 121-23 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 398 (1881); cf. Gibson v.
Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 584 (1896) (reaffirming the notion that a conviction by an
unconstitutionally constituted jury should be set aside, but determining that there was no
constitutional violation in the case at bar).
157. 339 U.S. 282, 299 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 290.
159. See id. at 301-02 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
160. See id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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defendant's trial in multiple ways.161 The grand jury, on the other
hand, does not have the same ability to affect the defendant's right to
a fair trial.1 62 Moreover, once a defendant has been convicted beyond
a reasonable doubt at a trial free from constitutional error, "it is
frivolous to contend that any grand jury, however constituted, could
have done its duty in any way other than to indict." 6 3
Despite Justice Jackson's strong dissent in Cassell, in Rose v.
Mitchell" the Court reiterated its preference for the automatic
reversal rule in the context of grand jury foreperson selection.
Mitchell involved a federal habeas corpus claim of racial
discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman. 165 Although
the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
in Mitchell,166 the Court noted that discrimination in the selection of
the grand jury requires reversal of a state conviction.67 It observed,
however, that Justice Jackson's dissent in Cassell had for the first
time gained a following in the Court16 in the concurring opinion of
161. See id. (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson explained the risk of prejudice
inherent in petit juries:
The trial jury hears the evidence of both sides and chooses what it will believe.
In so deciding, it is influenced by imponderables-unconscious and conscious
prejudices and preferences-and a thousand things we cannot detect or isolate in
its verdict and whose influence we cannot weigh. A single juror's dissent is
generally enough to prevent conviction. A trial jury on which one of the
defendant's race has no chance to sit may not have the substance, and cannot
have the appearance, of impartiality, especially when the accused is [an African-
American] and the alleged victim is not.
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 302 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson pointed to various
differences between the grand jury and the petit jury, focusing mainly on the different
powers between the two institutions. See id. (Jackson, J., dissenting). The grand jury has
the power only to accuse, while the petit jury has the power to convict. See id. (Jackson,
J., dissenting). Also, because the grand jury need not be unanimous, it is unclear that one
juror could affect the indictment decision in the same manner as on a petit jury. See id.
(Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson further noted that "[t]he difference between the
function of the trial jury and the function of the grand jury is all the difference between
deciding a case and merely deciding that a case should be tried." Id. (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
163. Idt (Jackson, J., dissenting).
164. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
165. See id. at 547.
166. See iL at 558-59. No evidence was presented regarding the method of selecting a
foreman or the race of any of the past foremen in that county. See id. at 566-67. The
defendants only presented evidence regarding the selection of the grand jury venire. See
id. They did this by calling three of the jury commissioners to testify along with 11 of the
12 grand jurors who indicted the defendants. See id.
167. See id. at 559.
168. See id. at 552 ("Until today, only one Justice among those who have served on this
Court in the 100 years since Strauder v. West Virginia has departed from this line of
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Justice Stewart, who was joined by then-Justice Rehnquist.'6 9
Justice Jackson's view finally prevailed in Hobby v. United
States,170 some thirty-four years after Cassell was decided. In Hobby,
the Court addressed a white defendant's claim of discriminatory
selection of the grand jury foreperson in the Eastern District of
North Carolina.171 The Court proceeded on the assumption that
discrimination had occurred in the selection of the grand jury
foreperson and acknowledged that the Fifth Amendment forbids this
type of discrimination. 72 The only issue before the Court was "the
narrow one of the appropriate remedy for such a violation."'173 The
Court held for the first time that discrimination in the selection of a
juror did not warrant reversal of the conviction. 174 The Court
distinguished Mitchell by stating that Mitchell dealt with an equal
protection claim, while Hobby dealt with a due process claim. 75 The
harm that came to Hobby because of discrimination in the selection
of his grand jury foreperson was not enough, in the Court's eyes, to
warrant reversal of his conviction.76
In Vasquez v. Hillery,'7 decided just two years after Hobby, the
dissenters from Hobby'78 formed a narrow majority and applied the
decisions." (citation omitted)).
169. See id. at 574-79 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
170. 468 U.S. 339 (1984). Hobby's claim was brought under the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause because he was indicted by a federal grand jury, see id. at 343,
whereas Cassell's claim was based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, see Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282,283 (1950).
171. See Hobby, 468 U.S. at 341 ("In particular, he alleged that the grand jury selection
plan 'exclude[d] citizens from service ... on account of race, color, economic status and
occupation, in violation of ... the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.'" (quoting Brief for Appellant at 33, Hobby (No. 82-2140))).
172. See id. at 342-43.
173. Id at 342.
174. See id. at 346.
175. See id at 347. While the Court did not explain the significance of this distinction,
it should be noted that in Mitchell, the defendants were members of the excluded class,
while in Hobby, the defendant was not. See id. The Hobby Court discussed the fact that
in Mitchell, the defendants "suffered the injuries of stigmatization and prejudice
associated with racial discrimination" because they were members of the excluded class.
Id. In Hobby, the petitioner did not claim that discrimination had occurred against any
class of which he was a member. See id. The Court's disdainful treatment of Hobby's
"alleged injury" in this regard is difficult to square with its outcome in Peters v. Kiff, 407
U.S. 493 (1972), in which the Court overturned the conviction of a defendant who was not
a member of any group against which discrimination was directed. Id. For a discussion of
Peters, see supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
176. See Hobby, 468 U.S. at 346, 349.
177. 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
178. In Hobby, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens dissented. See Hobby, 468
U.S. at 350 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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automatic reversal rule in the case of grand jury discrimination. 179 In
Hillery, the defendant claimed discrimination in the selection of the
grand jury of Kings County, California, that indicted him for
murder.' The Court stated that reversal was the only effective
remedy for this type of violation.' It also stated that the remedy was
appropriate because the grand jury has a multitude of important
functions, including power over the degree of the charge, the number
of counts charged, and whether to charge a capital or noncapital
offense." 2 "Moreover," the Court emphasized, "'the grand jury is
not bound to indict in every case where a conviction can be
obtained.' "183 When discussing the harsh remedy of reversing the
conviction, the Court pointed out that once discrimination in jury
selection is eliminated, convictions no longer will have to be reversed
because of it."s
The issues of third-party standing, racial discrimination in the
179. See Hillery, 474 U.S. at 255. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
agreed that the harmless-error standard should not be adopted in cases of grand jury
discrimination. See id. at 255, 263-64. Justice White joined in this analysis, but did not
join in the sixth paragraph of Part III, see id. at 255, in which the Court stated, "[l]ike
these fundamental flaws, which never have been thought harmless, discrimination in the
grand jury undermines the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself, and is not
amenable to harmless-error review," id. at 263-64. Justice O'Connor concurred in the
judgment, but expressed some hesitation about the automatic reversal rule "[b]ecause [she
was] not convinced that a sufficiently compelling case ha[d] been made for reversing this
Court's precedents with respect to the remedy applicable to properly cognizable claims of
discriminatory exclusion of grand jurors." Id. at 267 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Powell, with whom Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist
joined, dissented on the grounds that the harmless-error standard should apply in this
context. See id. at 267-73 (Powell, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 255-56.
181. See id. at 262. The excluded juror also could pursue a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 243
(1994), the federal criminal prohibition against discrimination in the selection of grand and
petit jurors. See id. at 262 n.5; see also 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1994) (providing the current
version of the statute cited in Hillery). Pointing to the statute's ineffectiveness, however,
the Court has noted that "according to statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, that section has not been the basis for a single prosecution in the
past nine years." Hillery, 474 U.S. at 262 n.5. The only other remedy that has been
explored is under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), and the Court has stated that these § 1983 suits
are also extremely rare. See id. (citing Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970)). In
Carter, the Court held that African-Americans who have been excluded from grand jury
service are allowed relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Carter, 396 U.S. at 329-30 & n.17.
For discussions of § 1983, see Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations
and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 482 (1982); Comment, The Civil Rights Act:
Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361 (1951).
182- See Hillery, 474 U.S. at 263.
183. Id. (quoting United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Friendly, J., dissenting)).
184. See id. at 262.
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selection of the grand jury, and harmless error came together in
Campbell, implicating a number of other issues. First, the Court
appears to have significantly altered its third-party standing analysis,
both expanding the definition of injury-in-fact' s5 and deviating from
the closeness and obstacle requirements presented in Powers.ls6 The
decision may signal a general relaxation of third-party standing
requirements, or it may just demonstrate the Court's commitment to
eliminating racial discrimination within the court system."" Finally,
the Court's failure to apply automatic reversal in Campbell hints at a
disagreement over the blanket applicability of such a rule.8
Since Singleton v. Wulff,189 the Court has been expanding third-
party standing principles. 9  Campbell continues this trend, as
demonstrated primarily in the treatment of the injury-in-fact
requirement. Traditionally, injury-in-fact has been considered a
jurisdictional-that is, constitutional-requirement, rather than part
of the Court's discretionary considerations. 9' The Powers Court
consolidated the discretionary and jurisdictional requirements into a
single three-prong test. 92 The injury-in-fact requirement is merely
one factor in the test and was not explicitly given more weight than
the other factors. One could argue, however, that the fact that it is a
jurisdictional (constitutional) prerequisite requires the Court to give
it more weight than the other factors. 93 The Powers Court, however,
185. See infra notes 191-214 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 220-45 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 246-48,272-79 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 249-71 and accompanying text.
189. 428 U.S. 106 (1976); see supra notes 84-95 (discussing Wulf).
190. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991) (allowing third-
party standing for civil litigants); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (allowing, for
the first time, third-party standing based on a commercial relationship between the litigant
and the third parties); Kirk, supra note 110, at 708-09 (discussing the Court's departure
from precedent to allow third-party standing in Powers); see also Wulff, 428 U.S. at 128-31
nn.5-7 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stressing the departure of the
case from previous third-party standing analyses).
191. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text; see also Ryan Guilds, Comment, A
Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access,
74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1897 (1996) (discussing the need for a concrete injury to satisfy
Article III requirements and arguing that only a generalized injury was present in
Powers).
192. Compare Wulff, 428 U.S. at 112-14 (discussing the two different dimensions-
jurisdictional and discretionary-to the third-party standing analysis), with Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991) (collapsing the requirements from the two different
dimensions into a single three-prong test).
193. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1428 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven the Powers
majority acknowledged that such a showing is the foremost requirement of third-party
standing, as evidenced by the lengths to which it went in an attempt to justify its finding of
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failed to address the other two jurisdictional requirements of
standing: causation and redressability.
In Powers, the Court went to great lengths to establish injury-in-
fact,194 presumably for the reason that this element was originally
considered a constitutional requirement. Prior to Batson, when
discussing the harm to a defendant that comes from exclusion of
members of his own race from the jury, the Court had focused on the
bias that could result to the defendant from being tried by a jury of a
different race. 95 In Batson, the Court moved away from the
perspective that the race of the jurors would have bearing on their
bias towards the defendant.'96 In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co.," 7 the Court stated that classifications based on race are purely
irrational because a person's race has no relationship to her ability to
serve as a juror.98 Thus, the Court had to construct a new conception
of injury. Some commentators have noted that the way the Court
defines the injury determines whether standing will be granted.1 99
injury-in-fact."); see also Wulff, 428 U.S. at 112-14 (discussing the injury-in-fact
requirement as a prerequisite to standing and the other considerations as discretionary
factors); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) ("No principle
is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the
constitutional limitations of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.");
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 62, § 2.3.1, at 57 (differentiating between injury-in-fact, which
is a constitutional requirement, and the Court's "prudential limitations"); Guilds, supra
note 191, at 1866 (discussing the importance of Article III requirements in standing
analysis).
194. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 411-13; see also supra notes 110-13 (discussing the Powers
Court's view of injury-in-fact).
195. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 203, 210 (1995); Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless
Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 97-131 (1996);
Clem Turner, Note, What's the Story? An Analysis of Juror Discrimination and a Plea for
Affirmative Jury Selection, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 289,301-04 (1996).
196. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (discussing Batson).
197. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
198. See id. at 631 (contrasting rationality with race-based prejudices); cf. J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138 n.9 (1994) (noting that "[t]he majority of studies suggest that
gender plays no identifiable role in jurors' attitudes"). One commentator has noted that
the Court's philosophy embraces the idea that "group affiliation predicts nothing about
juror perspective." Muller, supra note 195, at 104.
199. See Sunstein, supra note 62, at 203-04. Professor Sunstein argues that the Court's
decision in Regents of the University v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), is a prime example of
the Court's willingness to recharacterize the injury so as to afford a remedy:
Bakke himself could not show that without the affirmative action program he
challenged, he would have been admitted to the medical school of the University
of California at Davis. It was therefore argued that he could not meet the Article
III requirement of injury-in-fact. The Court responded in a way that has
potentially major implications:
[E]ven if Bakke had been unable to prove that he would have been admitted
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One could argue that in Campbell and in Powers, if the injury were
still a concern regarding bias, the Court could not have recognized
injury in the context of a white defendant complaining of the
exclusion of African-American jurors.
Within this redefined concept of injury, the Powers Court
considered the effect racial discrimination has on public perception
of the court system. It relied on other factors as well, including the
particularized harm the defendant suffers when tried by those who
have lost respect for the processes of the court system. 20  In
Campbell, the Court modified the concept of injury-in-fact even
further than in Powers by exclusively focusing on the injury to the
perception of the court system.201 When discussing whether injury-in-
fact had been established, the Court made general references to the
necessity to preserve the appearance of integrity in the judicial
system and the central role the grand jury system plays in the
criminal justice process. 2°  Although the Court made a passing
reference to actual harm that the defendant might suffer if tried by a
biased judge,20 3 the emphasis was on the harm to the judicial system
that results from discrimination.2°4
The Court's treatment of injury-in-fact in Campbell is arguably a
significant departure from prior case law. Previously, the Court had
required that the injury be "distinct and palpable,' 25 "particular
[and] concrete, 2 6 or "specific [and] objective. ' 2°  The Campbell
in the absence of the special program, it would not follow that he lacked
standing.... The trial court found such an injury, apart from failure to be
admitted, in the University's decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all
100 places in the class, simply because of his race.
What happened here was that the Bakke Court found injury, causation, and
redressability by the simple doctrinal device of recharacterizing the injury.
Sunstein, supra note 62, at 203 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281 n.14); see also GEOFFREY
R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121 (3rd ed. 1996) (noting the tension between
the Court's denial of standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and
its grant of standing in Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated General Contractors,
508 U.S. 656 (1993), and arguing that the only difference between the two cases was the
Court's characterization of the relevant injury).
200. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
201. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 427 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (" 'Injury in
perception' would seem to be the very antithesis of 'injury in fact.' ").
202. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1423 ("The integrity of these decisions depends on the
integrity of the process used to select the grand jurors.").
203. See id. at 1424 ("If, by contrast, the allegations here are true, the impartiality and
discretion of the judge himself would be called into question.").
204. See id. at 1423-24.
205. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,501 (1975).
206. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974).
207. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,14 (1972).
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Court, however, did not attempt to recognize this type of harm to the
defendant.211 Moreover, the concern, highlighted in Powers, that the
"overt" act in open court might infect the jurors' disposition
throughout the trial was not present in the grand jury context of
Campbell.20 9  The Powers Court emphasized that the primary
constitutional violation occurred at trial,10 whereas in Campbell, the
constitutional violation occurred before trial.211 Nonetheless, the
Campbell Court held that injury-in-fact had been established .
21
Furthermore, a substantial majority213 held that injury-in-fact had
been established "with relative ease.
214
The other jurisdictional requirements of third-party standing,
redressability and causation, were not mentioned in Campbell.21 s The
Powers test seems to drop the two requirements from the third-party
standing analysis.1 6 One could argue that in Campbell, these two
208. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1423-24 (focusing on the harm to the court system,
rather than the harm to the defendant, when discussing injury); Guilds, supra note 191, at
1897 ("It is difficult to find a more speculative or generalized injury than a concern about
the 'integrity of the judicial process.' " (citations omitted)).
209. Justice Thomas asserted that
the judge's selection (rather than exclusion) of a single member of the grand jury
could hardly constitute an "overt" wrong that would affect the remainder of the
grand jury proceedings, much less the subsequent trial. The Court therefore
resorts to emphasizing the seriousness of the allegation of racial discrimination
(as though repetition conveys some talismanic power), but that, of course, cannot
substitute for injury-in-fact.
Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1427 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,412 (1991).
211. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1427 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (noting that the alleged harm did not occur in open court and, since it allegedly
occurred at the grand jury stage, it was before trial).
212. See id. at 1423-24.
213. The Court's decision in Campbell was unanimous with respect to Parts I, II, IV,
and V. Part III extended third-party standing to Campbell to assert his claim of
discrimination. See id. at 1422-24. Only six Justices, however, joined Justice Kennedy in
Part III of the opinion: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at 1421. Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented from this
portion of the Court's opinion because both Justices believed that Powers should have
been overruled, and that, even accepted on its own terms, Powers should not have been
applied in the context of Campbell's claims of discrimination. See id. at 1426-27 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. Id. at 1422 ("On occasion, however, we can ascertain standing with relative ease
by applying rules established in prior cases. Campbell's equal protection claim is such an
instance." (citation omitted)).
215. See id. at 1422-24 (applying the Powers test for third-party standing).
216. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991) (discussing three criteria that
must be satisfied for third-party standing to apply). But see Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1428
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (implying that the Powers Court




requirements cannot be met.217 As compared to the petit jury, the
grand jury is further removed from the ultimate harm: the
conviction.218 It is difficult to show that discrimination in the
selection of the grand jury had any causal connection whatsoever
with the ultimate conviction handed down by the petit jury.219 Thus,
with respect to claims of racial discrimination in the selection of
grand and petit juries, Campbell and Powers read together indicate
that the Court will presume all of the traditional jurisdictional
requirements for standing: injury, causation, and redressability.
The Court has required a close relationship between the litigant
and the third party before exercising its discretion in favor of third-
party standing.' In Powers, the Court noted that the relationship
between the defendant and the excluded jurors was "as close as, if
not closer than, those we have recognized to convey third-party
standing in our prior cases,"' and pointed to the juror-defendant
bond that can develop during voir dire.' The "bond" argument was
weak in Powers,' however, and is not applicable to Campbell. First,
the Powers Court focused on the bond that develops and grows
between the defendant and the jurors throughout trial and into
sentencing. 24  This focus indicates that perhaps the Court
concentrated more on the bond between the defendant and the
remaining jurors than on the bond between the defendant and the
excluded jurors, whose rights the defendant was asserting.2  In
Campbell, no bond could have formed between the defendant and
the excluded jurors because the defendant did not participate in the
217. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1428 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
218. See id. at 1427 ("It would be to no avail to suggest that the alleged discrimination
in grand jury selection could have caused an indictment improperly to be rendered,
because the petit jury's verdict conclusively establishes that no reasonable grand jury
could have failed to indict petitioner.").
219. See id.; see also Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 301-03 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the differences between grand and petit juries).
220. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
221. Powers, 499 U.S. at 413 (citing Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715,720-
21 (1990)) (attorney/client relationship); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-93 (1976)
(commercial relationship); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)
(doctor/patient relationship). But see Kirk, supra note 110, at 708-09 (arguing that the
Court had normally required confidential or certain financial relationships to satisfy the
closeness requirement).
222. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 413.
223. See Kirk, supra note 110, at 709 (describing the Court's analysis of the relationship
as "scant" and "outside traditional precedential boundaries").
224. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 413.
225. See Kirk, supra note 110, at 710.
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selection of the grand jurors.226 Thus, it was impossible for him to
form a "bond" with any of the excluded jurors.'
In its enunciation of the Powers rule, the Campbell Court noted
that a defendant must show a "'close relationship'" to the excluded
jurors,22 but it did not use this language in the application of the
test. 29  Traditionally, part of what the "close relationship" test
attempted to discern was whether the litigant would be an effective
advocate for the third party.23° The query functioned, however, as a
measure of whether it was necessary for the Court to hear the
constitutional issue before it, as well as whether the third party would
benefit from a determination of the right at issue.231 The Court in
Campbell, however, asked only if the defendant would be an
"effective advocate" for the excluded juror.32 By only focusing on
the "effective advocacy" issue, the Court disregarded a major part of
the analysis.
The Powers Court focused on "the congruence of interests"
between the excluded juror and the defendant in eliminating
discrimination.z3 The Court stated that "[a] venireperson excluded
from jury service because of race suffers a profound personal
humiliation heightened by its public character. The rejected juror
may lose confidence in the court and its verdicts, as may the
defendant if his or her objections cannot be heard." Like the
Powers Court, the Court in Campbell noted a common interest
between the defendant and the excluded juror only in "eradicating
226. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1428 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also supra note 34 (explaining that the members of a Louisiana grand jury are
selected randomly after the judge chooses a foreperson).
227. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1428 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
228. Id. at 1423 (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106, 114-15 (1976))).
229. See id. at 1424.
230. See Wulff, 428 U.S. at 115 ("lT]he relationship between the litigant and the third
party may be such that the former is fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the
right as the latter."); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (stating that the presentation
of issues is sharper when the litigant has a personal stake in the litigation); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 62, § 2.3.1, at 56 (stating that a sufficient personal concern insures effective
advocacy and thus improves judicial decision-making).
231. See Wulff, 428 U.S. at 113-15.
232 Id. at 1424 ("We find no reason why a white defendant would be any less effective
as an advocate for excluded grand jurors than for excluded petit jurors.").
233. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 414.
234. I. at 413-14; see supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (discussing the need
to preserve integrity in the judicial system and suggesting that a breakdown of such
integrity may constitute injury-in-fact to a litigant).
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discrimination from the grand jury selection process."' 5 A "common
interest" standard for the relationship between the excluded juror
and the litigant was a departure from third-party standing
precedent2 6 which typically required a "close,"'
7 "professional," 238
"confidential,"' 9 or at least "commercial""24 relationship. 241
An argument exists that the obstacle to excluded jurors asserting
their own rights was not the same in Campbell as it was in Powers. In
Powers, the Court noted the difficulty that each juror excluded by
peremptory challenges faced in asserting her own right to be free
from discrimination.242 The Powers Court observed that an African-
American does not face the same obstacles in bringing a claim
alleging systematic exclusion as he does when alleging individual
discrimination by an individual prosecutor.243  In Powers, the
defendant focused on discrimination against individuals by individual
prosecutors.244  In Campbell, however, the defendant alleged
systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the position of
grand jury foreperson by the parish judicial system as a whole.2 45
Thus, a more liberal analysis of "obstacle" was conducted in
Campbell than in Powers.
The holding in Campbell raises the issue of whether the standard
for all third-party standing cases will be less stringent in the future, or
235. Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1424; see also Kirk, supra note 110, at 709 (discussing the
Powers Court's focus on the common interest between the excluded juror and the
defendant).
236. See Kirk, supra note 110, at 709.
237. Wulff, 428 U.S. at 117.
238. Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715,720-21 (1990).
239. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
240. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,192-93 (1976).
241. In Campbell, the Court asserted that the "common interest" of the excluded juror
and the defendant was in combating discrimination in the grand jury selection system. See
Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1424. Justice Thomas's opinion in Campbell articulates the
argument that the ability to meet the "common interest" standard is dependent on how
the Court characterizes the interest. See id at 1427 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). If the defendant's interest is characterized as having his conviction
overturned, the excluded juror and the defendant cannot meet even this diluted "common
interest" standard. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Regardless of whether black veniremen wish to serve on a particular jury, they do not
share the white defendant's interest in obtaining a reversal of his conviction.").
242. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1991) (noting the difficulty in asserting
claims against individual prosecutors versus asserting claims of systematic discrimination
within the court system).
243. See id. at 414-15; see also Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970)
(providing an example of a claim brought by African-Americans excluded from jury
service alleging systematic discrimination).
244. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 414.
245. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1421.
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whether the Campbell Court's treatment is particularized to the
context of discrimination within the court system. The Court in
Campbell did not explicitly narrow its holding to this context, so one
could argue that third-party standing requirements have become less
stringent in light of Campbell. Thus, the Court's zealous desire to
protect against discrimination may have an inadvertent impact on
third-party standing analysis in other contexts. The Court's outcome
in Campbell, however, follows a trend in third-party standing cases
dealing with claims of racial discrimination.246 Campbell certainly
reiterates and reinforces the proposition that the Court will not back
down in its effort to eliminate discrimination in state courts. The
Court's willingness to stretch third-party standing principles shows a
determination to provide redress for grievances concerning racial
discrimination.2 47 Perhaps, then, this type of liberal injury-in-fact
analysis will not apply outside the context of racial discrimination in
the courts. 48
In addition to deviating from precedent in its granting of third-
party standing, the Court in Campbell was not entirely consistent
with precedent in its provision of a remedy.249 The Court previously
had held that long, unexplained absences of African-Americans from
jury boxes could establish a prima facie case of discrimination2 0
246. See Guilds, supra note 191, at 1898 (arguing that the Court only applies this type
of "generalized grievance analysis" when racial stigmatization is at issue); Kirk, supra note
110, at 691 (stating that the Court tends to "step outside of legal precedent in order to
impose judge-made remedies designed to curb racial discrimination").
247. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55-56 (1992) (noting that a state has third-
party standing to challenge a defendant's use of peremptory strikes against African-
Americans on equal protection grounds). See generally Guilds, supra note 191, at 1896
(discussing the Court's special treatment of racial discrimination as a generalized injury).
248. See Guilds, supra note 191, at 1898 ("[T]rying to extend the Court's generalized
grievance analysis beyond the limited confines of racial stigmatization is probably an
unprofitable exercise.").
249. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262 (1986); see also McCord, supra note 147,
at 1403-54 (discussing the history of the automatic reversal rule); Muller, supra note 195,
at 97-131 (same); James Edward Wicht, III, There Is No Such Thing as a Harmless
Constitutional Error: Returning to a Rule of Automatic Reversal, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 73,
75-86 (1997) (same).
250. See Hillery, 474 U.S. at 259 (" '[C]hance or accident could hardly have accounted
for the continuous omission of [African-Americans] from the grand jury lists for so long a
period as sixteen years or more.'" (quoting Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942)));
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (determining that the disparity between the
county's Mexican-American population and the number called for jury service established
a prima facie case of discrimination); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970) (stating
that the disparity between the county's African-American population and the number of
African-Americans on the grand jury list was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967) (holding that the disparity
between the number of African-Americans in the county and those actually selected for
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Generally, if the defendant proves such a prima facie case of
discrimination in the selection of jurors, and the prosecution fails to
rebut this claim, the defendant's conviction will be reversed by the
Supreme Court" 1 The Court had held that no other remedy is
appropriate for this type of grievance. 2 In Campbell, however, even
though the defendant presented unrebutted evidence, 3 of a type
which was held sufficient to constitute prima facie proof of
discrimination in prior decisions, the Court did not reverse
Campbell's conviction.1 4 Instead, it limited its holding only to the
grand jury service established a prima facie case of discrimination).
Compare this use of statistics with the use of statistics in death penalty sentencing, in
which statistical evidence is not enough to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987). In McClesky, an African-American
defendant was convicted of armed robbery and the murder of a white police officer and
sentenced to death. See id at 283. In seeking relief from his sentence, the defendant
argued that capital punishment was administered in a racially discriminatory manner in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 286. To support this claim, the
defendant offered statistical proof regarding the effect of race on the imposition of the
death penalty. See itL at 286-87. The statistical evidence offered as proof of
discrimination in McKlesky was compiled in a study performed by Professors David C.
Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth, and is known as the Baldus study. See
id at 286. The Baldus study examined over 2000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia
during the 1970s. See id Its results indicated a "disparity in the imposition of the death
sentence in Georgia based on the race of the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the
race of the defendant." Id. The Court held that this statistical evidence was not sufficient
proof of purposeful discrimination. See id. at 299. The Court noted that this type of proof
is sufficient in claims of discrimination within jury selection, but it distinguished statistical
evidence in the context of capital punishment sentencing on three grounds: (1) difficulty
in deducing a "state policy" from the various people examined in the Baldus study; (2)
lack of opportunity for the state to rebut the charges of the Baldus study; and (3) the
nature of what is being challenged. See id. at 294-97.
251. See, e.g., Hillery, 474 U.S. at 260-64; Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 551 (1979);
Partida, 430 U.S. at 492-501; Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1972); Arnold
v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773, 774 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958);
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1955); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Rogers v. Alabama,
192 U.S. 226 (1904); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S.
370 (1880).
252. See Hillery, 474 U.S. at 262 & n.5 (discussing alternative remedies and concluding
that reversal of the conviction is the only effective one); Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 558
(upholding automatic reversal as the appropriate remedy for discrimination in the
selection of a grand jury foreperson).
253. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Campbell (No. 96-1584), available in 1998 WL
27944, at *13 (Jan. 20, 1998).
254. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1425-26 (reversing the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision to deny Campbell standing-but not reversing Campbell's conviction-and
remanding the case to determine whether discrimination had taken place). But see
Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 551 ("[W]here sufficient proof of discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been made out and not rebutted, this Court uniformly has
required that the conviction be set aside and the indictment returned by the
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issue of standing, 5 remanding the case to the state court for a
determination of whether discrimination had actually occurred. 6
Although the Court stated that it was not able to decide the
remedy issue because that issue was not properly presented in
petitioner's brief,157 generally, the Court can hear any issue "fairly
subsumed" by the issues presented.28  In Peters v. Kiff,59 for
example, the Court addressed an issue not properly stated in the
issues presented but addressed in the petitioner's arguments.2 ° In
deciding to hear the claim of discrimination in the selection of the
petit jury in Peters, the Court emphasized that the "State ... had
unconstitutionally constituted grand jury be quashed."). Compare Partida, 430 U.S. at
495-501 (noting that a prima facie case for discrimination is made by showing that an
excluded juror is a member of a distinct and recognizable group that has been substantially
underrepresented over a significant period of time), Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463,
464-69 (1947) (noting that the lack of an African-American on the state's grand juries for
more than 30 years was proof of discrimination), and Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404
(1942) (holding that the absence of African-Americans from grand jury lists for more than
16 years creates an inference of discrimination), with Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1425-26
(remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing on discrimination when the defendant
produced uncontested evidence that no African-Americans had served as foreperson for
over 16 years even though 20% of the registered voters in the parish were African-
American).
In Campbell, even the State conceded that if the Court determined that there was
unconstitutional discrimination in the selection of the grand jury, automatic reversal
would be the appropriate remedy. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Campbell (No. 96-
1584), available in 1998 WL 27944, at *19 (Jan. 20, 1998).
255. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1422; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, Campbell
(No. 96-1584), available in 1998 WL 27944, at *11-*16 (Jan. 20, 1998) (questioning the
petitioner as to why the Court should decide remedy issues when the issues presented only
concerned standing).
256. See Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1425-26.
257. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Campbell (No. 96-1584), available in 1998 WL
27944, at *13-*14 (Jan. 20, 1998).
258. See id. at *14; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1983) (stating that
claims that are substantially connected to those presented are proper for the Court's
review); ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, § 3.20, at 1367 (7th ed.
1993) (stating that "the parties may enlarge upon the questions they do present as long as
the enlargement may be deemed fairly included or comprised within the stated
questions").
259. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
260. See id. at 495. With regard to this issue, the Court stated:
The respondent argues that the challenge to the petit jury is not before us,
because it fails to appear in the list of questions presented by the petition for
certiorari. We do not regard that omission as controlling, however, in light of the
fact that the two claims have been treated together at every stage of the
proceedings below, they are treated together in the body of the petition for
certiorari, and they are treated together in the brief filed by petitioner on the
merits in this Court.
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ample opportunity to respond to [the unenumerated] challenge. 261
Yet in Campbell, the Court would not address the issue of
remedy, despite the fact that the State did have an opportunity to
respond to the claims of discrimination . 62 The trial court judge held
an evidentiary hearing on the allegations of discrimination, where the
State was given an opportunity to rebut the inference of
discrimination. 63 No rebuttal was offered, however.2 4 Considering
Peters, it is unlikely, then, that the Campbell Court was concerned
only with the procedural issue of addressing the question of remedy
when it was not included in the questions presented.265 The
reluctance of the Court to address the remedy may reflect the Court's
uneasiness with the rule of automatic reversal in the context of grand
jury discrimination.
Throughout the nineteenth century, "American courts generally
operated under the [principle] that any error in the trial court
proceedings" mandated automatic reversal.2 66 Commentators have
noted, however, that the Court has gradually shifted its position to
one in which it reverses only for errors that "seriously undermine the
truthfinding function. 267 These commentators argue that the Court
has created a dichotomy of errors: trial versus structural errors.268
Structural errors demand automatic reversal of the conviction, while
trial errors do not.269 Included in the list of structural errors is the
exclusion of members of a defendant's race from a grand jury.270
Extension of this principle to exclusion of members of a different
race from the grand jury apparently was too much of a stretch for the
Campbell Court, however, perhaps because the rule is not based on a
261. Id.
262. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Campbell (No. 96-1584), available in 1998 WL
27944, at *13-*15 (Jan. 20, 1998).
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's willingness
to address a question in Peters that was not properly presented).
266. McCord, supra note 147, at 1403; see also Muller, supra note 195, at 107
(discussing the history of the automatic reversal rule); Wicht, supra note 249, at 74 (same).
267. Muller, supra note 195, at 110; see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Comment, Arizona
v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV.
L. REv. 152, 156-61 (1991) (discussing the change over the years in the Court's position
regarding the automatic reversal rule).
268. See McCord, supra note 147, at 1407-12 (discussing the dichotomy); Hon. John M.
Walker, Jr., Harmless Error Review in the Second Circuit, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 395, 397
(1997) (same).
269. See McCord, supra note 147, at 1407-12.
270. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (opinion of Rehnquist,
C.J.) (citing Vasquez v. tHillery, 474 U.S. 254,264 (1986)).
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solid foundation.271
Campbell leaves many unanswered questions and foreshadows
changes in two main areas: third-party standing and the remedy of
automatic reversal in the context of grand jury discrimination. From
Batson to Powers to Campbell, the Court has formulated a new equal
protection analysis.272 That analysis is premised on the importance of
jury service and the harmfulness of discrimination against certain
cognizable groups.' It is not clear whether the principles of
Campbell and Powers-allowing third-party standing when racial
discrimination is implicated-will extend to other types of
discrimination. Batson's ban against discriminatory peremptory
strikes has been applied outside the context of racial discrimination
to discrimination based on other group characteristics.27 4 By analogy,
the third-party standing analyses of Powers and Campbell could also
271. See Muller, supra note 195, at 126 ("Whatever the conceptual validity of [Hillery]
vhen it was decided, it is now a relic from a bygone era."); see also supra notes 155-84 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's changes in position regarding the automatic
reversal rule in the context of grand jury discrimination in Cassell, Mitchell, Hobby, and
Hillery). Professor Muller's article discusses the struggle of the Court to fit grand jury
discrimination in with its other cases, in which the Court had held that automatic reversal
should only apply when a trial error had a "concrete impact on the reliability of the
conviction." Muller, supra note 195, at 125. He highlights the shift in the Court's
rationale for automatic reversal between Mitchell and Hillery. See id. at 124. In Mitchell,
the Court focused on the interest in deterring equal protection violations, but "[b]y 1986, it
was only barely tenable for the Court to suggest that a conviction should be reversed to
deter an equal protection violation that did not have concrete impact on the reliability of
the conviction." Id at 125. Thus, the focus by the Court in Hillery was "to show that
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors actually has a concrete impact on the
reliability of verdicts." Id. According to Professor Muller, "Justice Marshall labored
mightily to produce a reason why grand jury discrimination might affect the accuracy of a
subsequent conviction, but the strain is obvious." Id. at 126. Professor Muller also notes
that the Court does not seem convinced by this position. See id. ("In fact, it is not even
clear that Justice Marshall attracted five votes to the position that grand jury
discrimination is automatically reversible in every case .... "). The position in Hobby
augments the argument that the Court is very hesitant to apply the automatic reversal rule
in the context of "same class" discrimination in grand jury selection. See Hobby v. United
States, 468 U.S. 339, 347 (1984) (focusing on the fact that the defendant in Hobby did not
suffer the same degree of harm as the defendants in Mitchell because the defendant in
Hobby was not a member of the excluded class). This uncertainty on the Court's part may
explain its desire to avoid the question of the accuracy of the jury's conviction in
Campbell.
272. See Mary A. Lynch, The Application of Equal Protection to Prospective Jurors
with Disabilities, 57 ALB. L. REV. 289, 320-34 (1993) (describing the differences between
the equal protection analysis in Batson and its progeny and the traditional equal
protection analysis).
273. See id at 292.
274. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994) (extending Batson to gender-
based discrimination); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1991) (plurality
opinion) (extending Batson to ethnicity-based discrimination).
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extend to other types of discrimination." Some cases suggest that all
types of discrimination in jury selection-not just race-based
discrimination-may be the Court's target. 76 If this suggestion is so,
and the Court's concern extends to other types of discrimination, the
question is what other types of discrimination claims are left to be
addressed after Campbell. At least one commentator has argued that
the Batson protection should extend to discrimination based on
disabilities.2" Other commentators have focused on the extension of
protection to language-based discrimination.2 7 Possibly, the Court
will only vigorously protect those groups who are afforded
heightened scrutiny in equal protection review.279
275. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972) (plurality opinion) (declining to limit
the language of the opinion to concerns only about racial discrimination, and instead
expressing concern over the exclusion from jury service of "any large and identifiable
segment of the community").
276. See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 130-31 (extending Batson to gender-based
discrimination); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (extending
the holding of Powers to civil litigants); Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360-61 (plurality opinion)
(extending Batson to claims based on ethnicity brought by Latinos).
277. See Lynch, supra note 272, at 292.
278. See Justin B. Denton, Comment, Protecting Both Ethnic Minorities and the Equal
Protection Clause, 1997 BYU L. REv. 101,120 (questioning whether the Court will extend
Batson and its progeny to protect ethnic groups from language-based discrimination). It is
interesting to note that some states require the ability to "hear and understand the English
language" as a prerequisite to eligibility for jury service. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-
60(a)(2) (1975) (requiring as a qualification for jury service that a juror be able to "read,
speak, understand and follow instructions given by a judge in the English language"); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 893 (a)(3) (West 1985) (requiring that grand jurors have "sufficient
knowledge of the English language"); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30512, 305/9 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1998) (stating that a prerequisite for jury service is the ability to speak and
understand English); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-4-5-7 (b)(2) (Michie Repl. 1998) (disqualifying
from jury service those prospective petit jurors who do not have "a degree of proficiency
[in the English language] sufficient to fill out satisfactorily a juror qualification form");
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 401(3) (1991) (requiring that a prospective juror have
the "ability to read, write and speak the English language and be possessed of sufficient
knowledge of the English language"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3 (1996) (requiring the ability
to "hear and understand the English language").
279. See Denton, supra note 278, at 119-20. Lower courts have declined to extend the
Batson line of cases to prohibit discrimination based on classifications accorded rational
basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 886
F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1989) (allowing the striking of a young juror); United States v.
Moreno, 878 F.2d 817, 820-21 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that age, marital status, and
unemployment are valid reasons for peremptory challenges); United States v. Harrell, 847
F.2d 138, 139 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (upholding under Batson a challenge to an
unemployed juror lacking secondary education); United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741,
748-49 (3d Cir. 1988) (determining that a challenge against a young, single juror did not
violate Batson); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (determining that a
peremptory strike based on the juror's religion does not violate Batson). All of these
classifications, with the possible exception of religion, are afforded rational basis review,
the lowest level of equal protection scrutiny. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
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The Court's future position on automatic reversal with respect to
grand jury discrimination is more difficult to predict. Hillery, Hobby,
and Campbell demonstrate that the Court is presently not certain
about its position regarding automatic reversal. The harmless error
argument is a compelling one when the complaint is one of
discrimination in the context of grand jury selection and when the
defendant is not a member of the excluded class. The argument
becomes even more compelling if the defendant was convicted
beyond a reasonable doubt by a petit jury free of racial
discrimination. In such a situation, a court may find it difficult to
justify applying the automatic reversal rule, especially when it
considers the burden this places on the judicial system and society as
a whole.20
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal protection of the
laws."' As it has done many times in the past, the Supreme Court in
Campbell applied this provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to
force state courts to eliminate discrimination within jury selection.8
The Court has struck an interesting balance in Campbell, continuing
to express its disdain for racial discrimination in the court system, but
also moving toward more stringent standards for the automatic
reversal rule.
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